Recoil

Painful though it is, this oil shock will eventually spur huge change. Beware the hunt for scapegoats.

IN THE early 1970s a fourfold rise in the price of oil almost brought the world to a standstill. The shock of the Arab embargo left a deep mark in many countries: America subjected its cars to fuel-efficiency standards, France embraced nuclear power—though sadly shoene rukku, or “energy-conscious fashion”, the inspiration for Japan's fetching short-sleeved business suit, was ahead of its time.

Thirty-five years on, oil prices have quadrupled again, briefly soaring to a peak of just over $135 a barrel. But, so far, this has been a slow-motion oil shock. If the Arab oil-weapon felt like a hammer-blow, this time stagnant oil output and growing emerging-market demand have squeezed the oil market like a vice. For almost five years a growing world shrugged it off. Only now is it recoiling in pain.

Gordon Brown, Britain's prime minister, thinks the big oil producers can be persuaded to come to the rescue. But only Saudi Arabia shows any enthusiasm for that. Elsewhere, output is growing agonisingly slowly. That is causing hardship and recrimination. But it could also come to represent an opportunity. The slow-motion shock seems irresistible today, but in time it will give rise to an equally unstoppable and more positive slow-motion reaction.

Action replay

It is clear that high oil prices are hurting many economies—especially in the rich world. Goldman Sachs reckons consumers are handing over $1.8 trillion a year to oil producers. The wage-price spiral of the 1970s has been avoided, but the income shock is painful. Beset by scarce credit, falling asset prices and costly food, developed-country households are hardly well-equipped to foot the oil bill. America's emergency tax rebate, voted this year to help people cope with the credit crunch, has in effect been taken right away again.

Stuck for answers, politicians have been looking for scapegoats. Top of the list are the speculators profiting from other people's hardship. Some $260 billion is invested in commodity funds, 20 times the level of 2003. Surely all that hot money has supercharged the demand for oil? But that is plain wrong. Such speculators do not own real oil. Every barrel they buy in the futures markets they sell back again before the contract ends. That may raise the price of “paper barrels”, but not of the black stuff refiners turn into petrol. It is true that high futures prices could lead someone to hoard oil today in the hope of a higher price tomorrow. But inventories are not especially full just now and there are few signs of hoarding.

If the speculators are not to blame, what about the oil companies, which have failed to increase output in spite of record profits? Profiteering, say some. However, that accusation doesn't stand up to much scrutiny either. The oil price is set in a market. For Shell, Exxon et al to hoard oil underground would be to leave billions of dollars of investment languishing unused. Others fear that oil is pricey because it is running out. But there is little evidence to support the doctrine of “peak oil” in its extreme form. The Middle East still seems to contain a sea of the stuff. Even if new finds elsewhere have been rarer and less accessible than in the past, vast quantities of oil could now be profitably stripped from tar sands and shale.

The truth is more prosaic. Finding and developing new oil fields is an expensive and time-consuming business. The giant new fields in the deep water off Brazil are unlikely to produce oil for a decade or more. Furthermore, oil is perverse. When prices are low, oil-rich countries welcome the low-cost, high-tech and well-capitalised oil firms. When prices are high, countries like Russia and Venezuela kick them out again. Likewise the engineers, survey ships and seismic rigs that oil firms need to find and produce new deposits are expensive right now. The costs of finding oil have, temporarily, doubled precisely because everybody wants to give them work.

Hope at the bottom of the barrel

So the oil shock will take time to abate. Some greens may welcome that, seeing three-figure oil as a way of limiting greenhouse emissions. Conservation will indeed increase. But everything high prices achieve could be done better by sensible carbon taxes. As well as curbing oil use, high prices have put tar sands in business which create far more carbon dioxide than conventional oil. Profits are going to ugly oil-fed regimes, not Western exchequers. And the wild unpredictability of prices will blunt the effect of dear oil on people's behaviour.

From this perspective, governments should speed up the adjustment—or at least stop delaying it. Half the world's people are sheltered from fuel prices by subsidies—which, perversely, have boosted demand and mostly benefited the better off. Now countries like Indonesia, Taiwan and Sri Lanka have begun to realise that they can ill afford this. Cutting fuel taxes in the rich world makes no sense either (see article). There are better ways to return cash to struggling voters.

The 1970s showed how demand and supply, inelastic in the short run, eventually give rise to conservation and new production. When all those new fields are on-stream, when the SUVs have been sold and the boilers replaced, the downcycle will take hold. By then the slow-motion oil shock could have catalysed momentous change. Right now motorists have no substitute for oil. But it is no coincidence that car companies are suddenly accelerating their plans to sell electric hybrids that are far cheaper to run than petrol or diesel cars at these prices. The first two oil shocks banished oil from power generation. How fitting if the third finished the job and began to free transport from oil's century-long monopoly.

~The Economist